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From Chevron to Massachusetts: 
Justice Stevens’s Approach to 
Securing the Public Interest  
Kathryn A. Watts∗ 
During the past three decades, one Supreme Court justice — John Paul 
Stevens — has authored two of the most significant administrative law 
decisions that speak to the judiciary’s role in checking agency 
interpretations of the statutes that they administer. In Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Justice Stevens’s 
landmark 1984 decision unanimously upheld the EPA’s construction of a 
term found in the Clean Air Act. Subsequently, in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
Justice Stevens’s 2007 opinion for a five-justice majority handed a major 
win to global environmental security by ordering the EPA to reconsider its 
refusal to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. Although 
both decisions were written by Justice Stevens and both involved the EPA 
and the Clean Air Act, the two decisions seem to send very different 
messages about the judiciary’s policing function. In Chevron, the Court 
embraced a highly deferential, hands-off view of the judiciary, whereas in 
Massachusetts, the Court embraced a more protective, active judicial role. 
In light of the seemingly divergent messages in these two decisions, this 
Article assesses Justice Stevens’s position on the judiciary’s policing role 
concerning agency actions that impact matters of public security, health, 
safety, and welfare. This Article ultimately concludes that when Justice 
Stevens’s opinions are viewed as a whole, a fairly clear picture emerges: 
Justice Stevens cannot accurately be labeled as either the proponent of a 
highly deferential, hands-off judiciary (à la Chevron), or the proponent of 
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an active judiciary (à la Massachusetts). Rather, as a strong adherent of 
purposivism, Justice Stevens seeks to effectuate Congress’s own animating 
goals, paying particularly close attention to Congress’s protective and 
remedial purposes. Thus, although he expressly eschews deciding cases 
based on his own policy preferences, his purposivist approach to statutory 
interpretation often enables him to give agencies the leeway they need to 
achieve Congress’s broad protective or remedial goals and conversely to 
check agencies when they act counter to Congress’s purposes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Administrative agencies in the United States play a wide-reaching, 
pervasive role in regulating matters that impact public health, safety, 
welfare, and security.1 The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), 
for example, protects the safety, efficacy, and security of the nation’s 
food and drug supply.2 Actions taken by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) limit threats to our air and water, as well as to the 
security of our global climate.3 The Consumer Product Safety 
Commission aims to “save lives and keep families safe by reducing the 
risk of injuries and deaths associated with consumer products.”4 And, 
as the recent financial crisis has highlighted, actions taken by a 
number of agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Department of Treasury, can significantly impact our nation’s 
financial security.5 
 
 1 This Article uses the term “security” broadly to include much more than simply 
military or national security. See S. NEIL MACFARLANE & YUEN FOONG KHONG, HUMAN 
SECURITY AND THE UN: A CRITICAL HISTORY 1 (2006) (discussing how in last 20 years of 
20th century, concept of “security” has expanded beyond its traditional focus on 
national or state security and has “expanded horizontally beyond military issues to 
take into account others, such as economy, environment, health, gender, and culture, 
in context of expansion of core values to include welfare and identity”); see also id. at 
12 (noting that “[m]ost would agree that military affairs are intrinsically linked to 
notion of security” but that term “security” now implies much broader meaning); 
Emma Rothschild, What Is Security?, DAEDALUS, Summer 1995, at 53, 55 (discussing 
how concept of security has broadened from military issues to also cover “political, 
economic, social, environmental, or ‘human’ security”).  
 2 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA’s Mission Statement, 
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html (last visited May 28, 2009) 
(“The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, 
efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical 
devices, our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.”).  
 3 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007) (noting that petitioners 
seeking certiorari called global warming “the most pressing environmental challenge 
of our time”); see also Examining the Case for the California Waiver: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 
110th Cong. 27 (2007) (testimony of Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Att’y Gen. of Cal.) 
(“Global warming is the most important environmental and public health issue we 
face today.”). 
 4 U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/faq.html (last visited May 28, 2009).  
 5 See generally Kevin G. Hall & Margaret Talev, Obama to Financial Sector: More 
Regulation Is Coming, NEWS & OBSERVER, Dec. 18, 2008, at 1A (discussing how 
regulatory agencies and their weak regulatory approaches have been blamed for 
economic crisis).  
  
1024 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:1021 
Given administrative agencies’ pervasive powers over matters that 
impact the public’s health, security, and welfare, it is not surprising 
that much of administrative law seeks to define the proper boundaries 
of agency action and how agency action will be policed. Of particular 
importance is the judiciary’s role in policing agency constructions of 
enabling legislation. For example, what role should the judiciary play 
in evaluating the EPA’s determination that it lacks the authority to 
regulate certain emissions that lead to global warming because the 
emissions, according to the EPA, fall outside the reach of the term “air 
pollutant” as it is used within the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)?6 Similarly, 
what role should the courts play in reviewing the FDA’s legal 
conclusion that tobacco products — a major killer in the United States 
— can be regulated within the meaning of the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act?7 
During the past three decades, one Supreme Court Justice, John 
Paul Stevens, has authored two of the most significant administrative 
law decisions that address the judiciary’s role in checking 
administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations. In 1984, in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Justice Stevens 
wrote a unanimous opinion for the Court, upholding the EPA’s 
construction of the term “stationary source” found in the CAA, despite 
environmentalists’ claims that the EPA’s interpretation would fail to 
clean up air pollution.8 Subsequently, in Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice 
Stevens authored an opinion in 2007 for a five-justice majority 
ordering the EPA to reconsider its refusal to regulate greenhouse gases 
under the CAA, thus handing a major win to global environmental 
security.9 Today, Chevron stands as a landmark decision because it 
 
 6 Cf. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497 (holding in split 5−4 decision that EPA has 
statutory authority to regulate certain emissions that lead to global warming).  
 7 Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (holding 
in split 5−4 decision that FDA lacks statutory authority to regulate tobacco products).  
 8 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-42 
(1984). For an excellent history and discussion of the Chevron decision, see generally 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (chronicling Chevron’s 
creation).  
 9 See generally Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497 (sending EPA back to drawing 
board to reconsider whether to regulate certain greenhouse gas emissions). 
Highlighting the significance of the case, one scholar has said that Massachusetts was 
an “enormous, if narrow, victory for environmentalists: it legitimized their concerns 
about global warming and their claims that the administration was not doing what it 
should to address it.” Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 
93 VA. L. REV. (IN BRIEF) 53, 53 (2007) [hereinafter Cannon, Significance], available at 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cannon.pdf.  
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erected what is now known as Chevron deference, which calls for 
deference to certain agency constructions of ambiguous statutory 
terms.10 Massachusetts similarly serves as a highly significant decision 
because it made major inroads in administrative law doctrine and also 
because it addressed a major social issue — global warming.11  
Although Justice Stevens wrote both decisions and each involved the 
EPA and the CAA, Chevron and Massachusetts seem to send very 
different messages about the judiciary’s policing function. In Chevron, 
the Court embraced a highly deferential, hands-off view of the 
judiciary in handing a win to the Reagan Administration’s EPA and a 
loss to environmentalists. In contrast, in Massachusetts, the Court 
embraced a much more active judicial role in handing a win to global 
environmental security and a loss to the Bush Administration’s EPA. 
Thus, as one scholar has commented, “[b]oth in tone and substance, 
Justice Stevens’s [Massachusetts] opinion looks like his Chevron 
opinion turned inside out.”12 
In light of the seemingly divergent messages that Massachusetts and 
Chevron send, this Article assesses Justice Stevens’s position on the 
judiciary’s role in policing administrative action. Does Justice Stevens 
stand as the proponent of a hands-off judiciary (à la Chevron), or as an 
advocate of a more active, protective judiciary (à la Massachusetts)? 
More specifically, what is Justice Stevens’s approach when it comes to 
policing statutory interpretations issued by agencies that impact the 
public interest?13 Is there anything unique about his judicial approach 
 
 10 See infra Part I.A. 
 11 See Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking 
New Ground on Issues Other than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1030 
(2007) (discussing legal significance of case); see also Cannon, Significance, supra note 
9, at 61-62 (noting that decision provides “rallying point for climate changes 
advocates” and that it may be as close to “Brown v. Board of Education for the 
environment” as we will ever come). 
 12 Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 
93 VA. L. REV. (IN BRIEF) 75, 84 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/ 
inbrief/2007/05/21/cass.pdf.  
 13 The phrase “public interest,” which was commonly used in New Deal-era 
legislation, is often used by Congress in describing the boundaries of legislative 
delegations to agencies, as well as by agencies when they seek to justify their actions. 
See Paul R. Verkuil, Understanding the “Public Interest” Justification for Government 
Actions, 39 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 141, 141-150 (1998) (“The words ‘public 
interest’ are probably invoked more than any other to explain and justify government 
action, whether in delegations of legislative authority to agencies or in explanations by 
agency officials to the public.”). The phrase is concededly broad and amorphous. See 
id. at 141 (noting that words “public interest” are “rarely self-actualizing” and that “in 
some cases they seem virtually devoid of meaning”). However, “the courts have 
accepted it as a delegable standard to agencies.” Id. at 150. This Article seeks to 
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that enables him to provide particular judicial protection when 
matters of public security, health, safety, or welfare are involved?14  
In answering these questions, this Article reviews various opinions 
authored by Justice Stevens which, like Massachusetts and Chevron, 
involve the reasonableness of agencies’ statutory interpretations. This 
Article contends that, when Justice Stevens’s opinions are viewed as a 
whole, a fairly clear picture emerges: Justice Stevens cannot accurately 
be labeled as either the proponent of a highly deferential, hands-off 
judiciary or the proponent of an active, robust judiciary. Rather, as a 
strong adherent of interpretive purposivism,15 Justice Stevens pays 
particularly close attention to Congress’s own protective and remedial 
purposes, such as the protection of workers from discrimination or the 
protection of the integrity of animal species, air, and waters. As a 
result, although Justice Stevens expressly eschews deciding cases 
based on his own policy preferences, his purposivist approach to 
 
explore how Justice Stevens uses judicial review to ensure that agency action can be 
described as serving the “public interest.” In other words, what role does judicial 
review play in helping to check agency action and to ensure that it serves the public 
interest?  
 14 Although the two primary cases analyzed in this Article, Massachusetts and 
Chevron, involve environmental issues, this Article does not focus solely on 
environmental issues, but rather looks broadly at decisions written by Justice Stevens 
that involve agency action that can be said to touch in some way on matters of public 
security, health, safety, or welfare. In other words, this Article looks at Justice Stevens’s 
decisions involving a broad range of agency action, not just environmental action.  
 15 Justice Stevens repeatedly has made clear that he believes that “[s]tatutes 
should be construed in a manner consistent with their underlying policies and 
purposes.” Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 357 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 
644, 693 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “judges must always remain 
faithful to the intent of the legislature”); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 
550 U.S. 81, 107 (2007) (“The only ‘policy’ by which I have been driven is that which 
this Court has endorsed on repeated occasions regarding the importance of remaining 
faithful to Congress’ intent.”); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 577 
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In final analysis, any question of statutory 
construction requires the judge to decide how the legislature intended its enactment 
to apply to the case at hand.”). Accordingly, he is viewed as the leading champion of 
purposivism on the Court today. See generally Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of 
Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1913 (2006) (“Throughout his more than thirty 
years on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice John Paul Stevens has been a consistent 
proponent of a purposive, as opposed to textualist, brand of statutory 
interpretation.”); John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2006) (“For some time now, Justice Stevens has been 
the Court’s most vocal and, I believe, the ablest defender of what two generations of 
judges and lawyers took to be the post-New Deal consensus on statutory 
interpretation: the idea that legislation is a purposivist act, and that judges should 
interpret acts of Congress to implement the legislative purpose . . . .”).  
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statutory interpretation often enables him to facilitate Congress’s 
broad protective goals. In particular, Justice Stevens often either 
explicitly or implicitly draws upon the “remedial purpose” canon, 
which provides that protective and remedial statutes should be 
construed liberally rather than narrowly to effectuate their beneficial 
goals and purposes.16 
By giving a broad reading to Congress’s protective and remedial 
goals and purposes, Justice Stevens’s approach to statutory 
interpretation appears to give agencies the deference they need to 
achieve Congress’s goals, and conversely, to check agencies when they 
act counter to Congress’s protective or remedial purposes. This means 
that if an agency adopts a cramped reading of a statute that Congress 
intended to serve broad protective or remedial goals, Justice Stevens 
may refuse to defer to the agency’s views. For example, in 
Massachusetts, Justice Stevens refused to defer to the EPA when it 
interpreted the CAA narrowly to foreclose the regulation of certain 
greenhouse gases that lead to global warming.17 Conversely, if an 
agency adopts an expansive statutory reading that helps to further 
Congress’s broad protective or remedial purposes, Justice Stevens 
often will give deference to the agency’s views. For example, in his 
dissent in Rapanos v. United States,18 he argued that Congress’s broad 
goal of “protecting the physical, chemical and biological integrity of 
our waters” supported the Army Corps of Engineers’ determination 
that certain wetlands fell within the reach of the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”).19  
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I details Justice 
Stevens’s landmark opinions in Chevron and Massachusetts and 
discusses how these two decisions seem to offer two competing views 
of the judicial role: one that is highly deferential and another that 
envisions a much more active and protective judicial role. Part II then 
explores whether the apparent differences between Massachusetts and 
Chevron can be reconciled. It ultimately concludes that the cases’ 
differing approaches and tones can be reconciled when considered in 
 
 16 See generally Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the 
Remedial Purpose Canon, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 201 (1996) (describing how 
remedial purpose canon of statutory construction “states that remedial legislation 
should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the beneficial purpose for which it 
was enacted”).  
 17 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-29 (2007) (rejecting EPA’s contention 
that certain emissions from new motor vehicles are not “air pollutants” within 
meaning of CAA).  
 18 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  
 19 Id. at 799 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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light of Justice Stevens’s strong commitment to purposivism, which 
calls upon him to construe different statutory provisions in light of 
Congress’ animating goals and purposes. Finally, Part III describes 
how Justice Stevens’s purposivist approach to statutory interpretation, 
which often relies upon the remedial purpose canon, enables him 
either to give agencies the deference that they need to resolve statutory 
ambiguities in favor of the remedial or protective purposes that the 
statute was designed to protect, or conversely, to check agencies when 
they act counter to those purposes.  
I. CHEVRON AND MASSACHUSETTS: ONE AUTHOR, TWO VOICES 
During his time on the Court, Justice Stevens has penned two of the 
most significant opinions that speak to the proper role of the judiciary 
in overseeing agencies’ statutory interpretations: Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.20 and Massachusetts v. EPA.21 
However, rather than fitting together to tell a coherent story of the 
proper judicial role in the regulatory arena, these two opinions seem, 
at least on their surface, to point in opposite directions.  
A. Chevron: A Win for Judicial Deference, a Loss for Environmental 
Interests 
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Chevron stands today as a landmark 
decision, providing the Court’s most significant pronouncement on 
the allocation of interpretive power between courts and agencies.22 In 
its mere twenty-five years of life, Chevron has spawned voluminous 
scholarly commentary.23 It also has been cited in more than 10,000 
 
 20 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 21 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
 22 See Merrill, supra note 8, at 399 (noting that Chevron provides “leading 
statement about the division of authority between agencies and courts in interpreting 
statutes”).  
 23 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2637 (2003); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and 
Lawmaking under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill & 
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill 
& Kathryn Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: 
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 
73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990); Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie 
Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997 (2007) [hereinafter Watts, Adapting]. Faced with this 
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judicial opinions,24 easily surpassing famous cases such as Marbury v. 
Madison25 and Roe v. Wade26 in the number of subsequent citations to 
them. It also is quickly catching up to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.27 
Chevron’s landmark status is a bit ironic given that Justice Stevens did 
not expect the case to become a bestseller.28 Nor did he think that he 
was breaking new doctrinal ground when he wrote the opinion for the 
Court.29 In fact, as Professor Thomas Merrill has detailed, at the time 
Chevron was briefed, argued, and decided, the case was widely viewed 
as a routine but complex case turning on a technical statutory issue 
involving the CAA.30  
At issue in Chevron was the meaning of one specific phrase found in 
the CAA Amendments of 1977 — the phrase “stationary source.”31 
The 1977 amendments contained various requirements applicable to 
states that had failed to achieve national air quality standards.32 The 
amendments required these states, called “nonattainment” states, to 
establish permit programs that would regulate “new or modified major 
 
outpouring of scholarly attention, Justice Stevens has commented that the “opinion 
has been the subject of more scholarly comment than it really deserves.” John Paul 
Stevens, Random Recollections, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 279 (2005) [hereinafter 
Stevens, Random Recollections]. 
 24 According to a recent search using Westlaw’s KeyCite, 10,463 judicial opinions 
cite Chevron. Online search for 467 U.S. 837, Westlaw (May 15, 2009). 
 25 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marbury has been cited in some 3,331 judicial 
opinions. Online search for 5 U.S. 137, Westlaw (May 15, 2009).  
 26 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe has been cited in some 3,580 judicial opinions. Online 
search for 410 U.S. 113, Westlaw (May 15, 2009).  
 27 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie has been cited in 13,144 judicial opinions. Online 
search for 304 U.S. 64, Westlaw (May 15, 2009).  
 28 See generally Kenneth A. Manaster, Justice Stevens, Judicial Power, and the 
Varieties of Environmental Litigation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1963, 1999 (2006) (“Stevens 
himself did not consider his statement [in Chevron] as new in any respect, and he 
explicitly relied on numerous precedents to support his synthesis of analytic steps in 
judicial review.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Step Zero] (“Ironically, Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, 
had no broad ambitions for the decision; the Court did not mean to do anything 
dramatic.”).  
 29 See Merrill, supra note 8, at 420 n.76 (describing how Justice Stevens has 
publicly stated that he viewed Chevron as simple restatement of established law); see 
also Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1170-71 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Judicial deference to agencies’ views on statutes they 
administer was not born in Chevron . . . .”).  
 30 See Merrill, supra note 8, at 412-20. 
 31 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839-40 
(1984) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982)).  
 32 Id.  
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stationary sources” of air pollution.33 In October 1981, the Reagan 
Administration’s EPA implemented the permit requirement by 
promulgating a regulation that allowed states to adopt a “plant-wide” 
definition of the term “stationary source.”34 This definition meant that 
states could treat all pollution-emitting devices within the same 
industrial group as if they were encased within a “bubble.” In other 
words, under the EPA’s regulation, “an existing plant that contains 
several pollution-emitting devices [could] install or modify one piece 
of equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration 
[would] not increase the total emissions from the plant.”35 
After the EPA adopted its plant-wide definition, various 
environmental groups, including the National Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. and Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc., filed a 
petition for review in the D.C. Circuit seeking to set aside the EPA’s 
regulations.36 These groups objected to the EPA’s interpretation. They 
believed that the bubble concept would fail to improve air quality and 
would have the effect of locking in the status quo because plants 
would not be required to implement new pollution control technology 
so long as overall emissions within the plant did not increase.37 The 
D.C. Circuit ultimately agreed that the EPA’s regulations should be set 
aside, reasoning based on two of its prior precedents that the bubble 
concept was inappropriate in the context of a permit program that was 
designed to improve as opposed to merely maintain air quality.38 The 
Supreme Court then granted certiorari.39 
After the Court heard oral argument, the Justices were initially 
divided: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and O’Connor 
voted to affirm, whereas Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and 
Powell tentatively voted to reverse.40 Justices Marshall and Rehnquist 
did not participate in the decision, and Justice O’Connor ultimately 
also recused herself.41 Because Justice White was the senior Justice in 
 
 33 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982)) (emphasis added).  
 34 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans 
and Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 
14, 1981).  
 35 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.  
 36 See id. at 841 n.3.  
 37 See Merrill, supra note 8, at 403.  
 38 Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  
 39 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 461 U.S. 956 (1983). 
 40 See John Paul Stevens, In Memoriam: Byron R. White, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2002) [hereinafter Stevens, In Memoriam]; see also Merrill, supra note 8, at 415-16.  
 41 See Stevens, In Memoriam, supra note 40, at 2; see also Merrill, supra note 8, at 
415-19. 
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the majority, he was charged with assigning the writing of the opinion, 
and he chose to assign the opinion to Justice Stevens.42 Justice Stevens 
ultimately crafted an opinion joined by all participating Justices that 
upheld the EPA’s regulations.43  
The first paragraph of Justice Stevens’s opinion struck a reserved, 
nonjudgmental tone.44 It was devoid of any discussion of the 
magnitude of the social issue involved, merely highlighting the 
technical complexities of the case by summarizing the statutory 
amendments and the specific statutory term at issue. In addition, the 
opening paragraph summarized the question presented in the case in a 
way that emphasized the Court’s narrow judicial role: “The question 
presented by these cases is whether the EPA’s decision to allow States 
to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial 
grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’ is based 
on a reasonable construction of the statutory term ‘stationary 
source.’ ”45  
Justice Stevens’s embrace of a deferential, narrow judicial role in 
Chevron is now best known as the Chevron “two step,” which he 
articulated in the following passage:  
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
 
 42 See Stevens, In Memoriam, supra note 40, at 2 (“Byron was therefore the senior 
Justice in the majority, and he assigned the opinion to me.”); see also id. at 2 n.9 
(noting his gratitude to Justice White for assignment); Stevens, Random Recollections, 
supra note 23, at 279 (“I have always been grateful to Byron for asking me to write it.”). 
 43 Justice Stevens has commented that he is “sure that it was [his] thorough 
analysis of the facts, rather than any comment on the deference to be accorded to the 
agency, that persuaded both [Burger and Brennan] to switch sides and give [him] a 
unanimous Court.” Stevens, Random Recollections, supra note 23, at 279. 
 44 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
 45 Id. at 840 (emphasis added).  
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the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.46 
As this passage explains, the first step of the inquiry asks whether 
Congress’s “intent” is clear — an inquiry that Justice Stevens said can 
be determined using traditional tools of statutory construction.47 
Assuming that Congress’s intent is not clear, then the second step asks 
whether the agency’s resolution of any ambiguity in the statute is a 
reasonable reading, not whether it is the Court’s own preferred 
reading. Thus, the judicial role envisioned in the second step is quite 
limited because courts must defer to reasonable agency constructions 
and cannot simply substitute their own preferred statutory readings.48  
Applying this two-step inquiry to the facts at issue in Chevron, 
Justice Stevens concluded at step one that Congress did not have a 
specific intent as to the meaning of the term “stationary source.” A 
clear answer concerning the propriety of the bubble concept was not 
provided by the actual statutory text, the legislative history, or the two 
main purposes surrounding the permit program: (1) an economic 
interest in permitting capital improvements to continue, and (2) an 
environmental interest in improving air quality.49 This led Justice 
Stevens to conclude at step two that the EPA’s reading of the statutory 
ambiguity was permissible. He emphasized that the permit program 
sought to navigate two competing policies. The EPA’s construction, 
according to Justice Stevens, represented “a reasonable 
accommodation of manifestly competing interests.”50  
 
 46 Id. at 842-43. 
 47 See id. at 843 n.9. Although Justice Stevens framed the question in Chevron in 
terms of the clarity of Congress’s intent, Justice Scalia, the Court’s leading textualist, 
has framed the question in terms of whether the statute is clear rather than whether 
Congress’s intent is clear. See generally Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of 
Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 748-53 (2007) (discussing 
debate about whether step one is search for congressional intent or search for textual 
clarity and noting that Scalia has been champion of textualist approach to Chevron).  
 48 After Chevron was handed down, scholars widely debated the basis for Chevron’s 
mandatory rule of deference — some viewing it as hinging on quasi-separation of 
powers principles and others arguing that it rested on notions of congressional 
delegation. See generally Watts, Adapting, supra note 23, at 1005-06 (discussing how 
Chevron’s basis was widely debated for years). The Supreme Court recently provided 
an answer, clarifying that Chevron does rest on notions of congressional delegation, 
which means that Chevron applies only when Congress delegated power to the agency 
to act with the force and effect of law. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
229-32 (2001).  
 49 Chevron, 476 U.S. at 859-63.  
 50 Id. at 865.  
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As Justice Stevens explained, whether the Court would have selected 
the same reading of the statute if left to its own devices was irrelevant 
because the judicial task is not to resolve “the struggle between 
competing views of the public interest” but rather to defer to 
legislators and administrators who are politically accountable for their 
policy decisions.51 Relying upon democratic theory, Justice Stevens 
stated: 
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political 
interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy 
preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has 
delegated policy-making responsibility may, within the limits 
of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of the Government to make such policy 
choices — resolving the competing interests which Congress 
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left 
to be resolved by an agency charged with the administration of 
the statute in light of everyday realities. 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory 
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom 
of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable 
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must 
fail. In such a case, federal judges — who have no 
constituency — have a duty to respect legitimate policy 
choices made by those who do.52 
In this passage, Justice Stevens clearly articulated his view that when 
Congress has given an agency the power to fill statutory gaps, judges 
should respect the choices made by those agency officials who are 
more politically accountable than courts.53  
B. Massachusetts: A Loss for Judicial Deference, a Win for Global 
Environmental Security 
Approximately two decades after Justice Stevens wrote Chevron, he 
authored yet another major opinion for the Court that also involved 
 
 51 Id. at 865-66.  
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 865.  
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the EPA, the CAA, and statutory construction: Massachusetts v. EPA.54 
Unlike his Chevron opinion, however, Justice Stevens’s opinion in 
Massachusetts did not defer to the policy choices made by the EPA.  
Massachusetts involved the EPA’s denial of a rulemaking petition 
requesting that the EPA regulate certain motor vehicle emissions, 
including carbon dioxide, under section 202(a)(1) of the CAA. That 
section provides that the EPA Administrator “shall by regulation 
prescribe” standards applicable to the emission of “air pollutants” 
from new motor vehicles, “which in his judgment cause, or contribute 
to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare.”55 The rulemaking petition at issue in 
Massachusetts was filed in October 1999 by a group of nineteen private 
organizations, including Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace USA, 
which requested that the EPA regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
new motor vehicles that lead to global warming.56 Years later, in 2003 
during the Bush Administration, the EPA denied the rulemaking 
petition on two grounds. First, the EPA concluded that greenhouse 
gases were not “air pollutants” within the meaning of the Act and that 
it therefore lacked the statutory authority to regulate.57 Second, even if 
it did have the legal authority to act, the EPA concluded that it was 
justified in its refusal to regulate because of a long list of policy 
considerations that advised against regulation at that time. Some of the 
specific policy considerations that the EPA relied on included its 
desire to avoid piecemeal regulation, its concerns about scientific 
uncertainty, and its desire to avoid interfering with the President’s 
foreign policy initiatives.58 
After the EPA denied the rulemaking petition, various states, cities, 
and environmental organizations sought review in the D.C. Circuit, 
 
 54 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Many scholars have already noted the significance of the 
decision. See, e.g., Cannon, Significance, supra note 9, at 61-62 (discussing 
environmental importance of opinion); Cass, supra note 12 (asserting that Justices’ 
political inclination colored outcome of decision); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 
11, at 1029 (discussing legal significance of opinion); see also Robert V. Percival, 
Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s Growing Shadow, 2007 SUP. CT. 
REV. 111, 160 (noting that decision is “truly remarkable”).  
 55 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).  
 56 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 510.  
 57 Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, Control of Emissions from New 
Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925-29 (Sept. 8, 2003); see 
also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511-12. 
 58 Notice of denial of Petition for Rulemaking, Control of Emissions from New 
Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929-31; see also Massachusetts, 549 
U.S. at 511-12. 
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where a three-judge panel splintered three ways.59 Judge Randolph 
ducked a tricky Article III standing issue raised in the case and 
concluded that even if the EPA had the statutory authority to regulate, 
the EPA had acted permissibly in declining to regulate for policy 
reasons.60 Judge Sentelle would have decided the case on Article III 
standing grounds, concluding that no concrete or particularized injury 
was present in the case because global warming presents a generalized 
injury suffered by all.61 And Judge Tatel would have ruled against the 
EPA, concluding that petitioners had standing, that the EPA had the 
statutory authority to regulate, and that the EPA’s discretionary 
reasons for declining to regulate were not adequate.62 
When the Supreme Court reviewed the case, it did not fare much 
better than the D.C. Circuit in terms of speaking with a unified voice. 
Rather, the Court split 5−4, with Justice Stevens writing the majority 
opinion, echoing in large part Judge Tatel’s dissent below.63 In contrast 
to his opinion in Chevron, which began with a highly deferential tone 
devoid of substantive judgments about the underlying environmental 
issues, Justice Stevens’ opinion in Massachusetts began with a lengthy 
discussion of the history, the dangers, and the significance of global 
warming.64 Specifically, the first paragraph of his opinion described 
the issue of global warming as follows:  
A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided 
with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two 
trends are related. For when carbon dioxide is released into 
the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse, 
trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected 
 
 59 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 60 Id. at 285-90 (Randolph, J., announcing judgment of court and filing opinion).  
 61 Id. at 291 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment).  
 62 Id. at 293-94 (Tatel, J., dissenting).  
 63 Justice Stevens was joined in the majority opinion by Justices Kennedy, Souter, 
Ginsburg and Breyer. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion joined by 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in which he argued that Article III standing was 
lacking in the case. In addition, Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, which was 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, in which he argued 
that the EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition should be upheld on the merits.  
 64 See generally Cass, supra note 12, at 76 (“By the end of the first paragraph, 
readers understand that — no matter what obstacles stand in the way — this decision 
is going to command the Bush administration’s environmental decisionmakers to do 
what a Gore administration’s more eco-friendly administrators surely would have 
done: take steps to order automobile makers to cut back on the emissions that 
‘[r]espected scientists’ connect to global warming.”).  
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heat. It is therefore a species — the most important species — 
of a greenhouse gas.65 
He then stated that global warming had been called “the most pressing 
environmental challenge of our time.”66 In this sense, the Court made 
clear at the outset that it was acutely aware of what it called the 
“unusual importance of the underlying issue” of global warming.67  
After Justice Stevens concluded that Article III standing 
requirements were met in the case, he turned to the merits,68 first 
addressing the question of whether the CAA authorizes the EPA to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. He fairly 
quickly rejected the EPA’s conclusion that carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” within the meaning of 
section 202(a)(1) of the CAA. In rejecting the EPA’s narrow definition 
of the statutory term, Justice Stevens concluded that the statute was 
unambiguous. The CAA included a “sweeping” and “capacious” 
definition of the term “air pollutant,” expressly defining an “air 
pollutant” as including “any air pollution agent or combination of 
such agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter 
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”69 Justice 
Stevens acknowledged that the Congress that initially drafted section 
202(a)(1) may not have “appreciated the possibility that burning fossil 
fuels could lead to global warming,” but he noted that Congress’s use 
 
 65 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504-05 (2007).  
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. at 505-06 (noting that Court had granted certiorari notwithstanding serious 
jurisdictional arguments involving standing and notwithstanding absence of any 
circuit splits because of “unusual importance of the underlying issue” involved in 
case); see also Cannon, Significance, supra note 9, at 56 (“If we assume that the Court 
uses the first page of an opinion to tell us what is most important about the case, the 
most important thing in this case is that anthropogenic climate change is real and very 
serious.”). 
 68 Before turning to the merits of the case, Justice Stevens first had to deal with the 
question of whether Article III standing existed in the case. He ultimately concluded 
that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts — which deserved “special solicitude” in 
the standing analysis due to its status as a state — had standing because a rise in sea 
levels associated with global warming had already harmed and would continue to 
harm Massachusetts, which owned coastal land. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-26. 
For discussion of Massachusetts’ handling of the Article III standing issue, see 
generally Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 
112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing how Court erected new rule giving states 
special solicitude in Article III standing context); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 11 
(analyzing significance of Court’s standing analysis); Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State 
Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273 
(2007) (same). 
 69 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 555-56 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006)).  
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of “broad language” indicated Congress’s intentional effort to ensure 
regulatory flexibility so that “changing circumstances and scientific 
developments” would not render the CAA obsolete.70 Because 
greenhouse gases “fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious 
definition of ‘air pollutant,’ ” Justice Stevens held that the EPA indeed 
had the statutory authority to regulate.71 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stevens arguably did little more 
than apply step one of Chevron. He ultimately concluded in light of 
Congress’s use of broad statutory language that in this instance, unlike 
in Chevron, Congress had a specific intent on the statutory question at 
issue. Whether Justice Stevens’s ultimate conclusion about the clarity 
of Congress’s intent was correct,72 Justice Stevens’s opinion on the 
statutory authority issue remained true to the legal framework set 
forth in Chevron to the extent that it purported to assess whether or 
not Congress’s intent was clear.  
The same, however, cannot be said about the next portion of Justice 
Stevens’s opinion, which considered the propriety of the EPA’s 
reliance upon various policy concerns in declining to make a 
“judgment” regarding whether greenhouse gases endanger the public 
health and welfare. In declining to make a judgment, the EPA 
interpreted section 202(a)(1), which states that the EPA administrator 
shall regulate emissions “which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, 
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”73 The EPA read the statute’s use of the term 
“judgment” as providing it with the discretion to decline to make a 
judgment for policy reasons, such as concerns about scientific 
uncertainty and a desire to avoid stepping on the President’s toes in 
the foreign realm. 
In rejecting all of the EPA’s policy justifications, Justice Stevens 
reasoned that the EPA’s “laundry list” of reasons for not regulating 
was “divorced from the statutory text.”74 In other words, the EPA was 
required to “ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.”75 
According to Justice Stevens: 
 
 70 Id. at 532-35.  
 71 Id. at 532.  
 72 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito and Chief Justice Roberts did not find the 
statute to be unambiguous but rather felt that they were faced with “textual 
ambiguity.” Id. at 557-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 73 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 74 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531-34 (emphasis added).  
 75 Id. at 535. 
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While the statute does condition the exercise of the EPA’s 
authority on its formation of a “judgment,” that judgment 
must relate to whether an air pollutant “cause[s], or 
contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Put another 
way, the use of the word “judgment” is not a roving license to 
ignore the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise 
discretion within defined statutory limits.76 
Here, Justice Stevens made clear that he read the statute to require the 
EPA to ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute, not in 
broader policy considerations outside of the four corners of the 
statute.77 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting opinion, one difficulty 
with Justice Stevens’s reasoning is that the relevant statutory text 
makes it quite clear that when the EPA administrator actually “makes a 
judgment whether to regulate greenhouse gases, that judgment must 
relate to whether they are air pollutants that ‘cause, or contribute to, 
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.’ ”78 But the statute “says nothing at all about the 
reasons for which the Administrator may defer making a judgment.”79 
Although this congressional silence would seem to call for Chevron 
deference to the agency’s own reasonable interpretation of what 
constitutes an appropriate decisional factor, Justice Stevens’s opinion 
for the Court never explained why the EPA’s interpretation of the 
statutory term “judgment” did not deserve deference under Chevron.80 
It is here that Justice Stevens’s opinion diverges most dramatically 
from Chevron’s legal framework. Instead of giving the EPA room to 
make policy judgments in the face of statutory silence and ambiguity, 
Justice Stevens seemed to scold the EPA for relying on policy concerns 
when the statutory text said nothing about what types of extra 
 
 76 Id. at 532-33 (citation omitted).  
 77 See generally Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From 
Politics to Expertise, 2007 S. CT. REV. 51, 80 (explaining that Court determined that 
relevant statutory factors were scientific and causal and that they did “not include 
broader considerations of foreign affairs and public policy”).  
 78 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Freeman & 
Vermeule, supra note 77, at 84 (describing how Justice Scalia “excoriated the majority 
for collapsing” question of what statutory factors constrain making of judgment with 
question of what factors constrain agency’s decision not to make such judgment in 
first place).  
 79 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 80 See id. at 552-53.  
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statutory factors the EPA could consider in declining to a make a 
judgment.81  
C. Contrasting Chevron and Massachusetts 
When comparing Chevron and Massachusetts, the differences seem 
to far outweigh the similarities. Although both Chevron and 
Massachusetts involved major environmental issues of their eras and 
both involved the EPA, the CAA, and issues of statutory 
interpretation, the opinions look in many ways like ships passing in 
the night in terms of their outcomes, their substance, and their tones. 
In particular, the winners and losers in the cases differ. Chevron 
handed a win to the Reagan Administration’s EPA and a loss to the 
environmental groups challenging the EPA’s interpretation, whereas 
Massachusetts handed a loss to the Bush Administration’s EPA and a 
major win to global environmental security. The opinions also differ 
dramatically in tone. Chevron struck a reserved tone that highlighted 
the technical complexities involved, whereas Massachusetts used a 
much more searching, critical tone that played up the monumental 
significance of global warming.82 Finally, the opinions differ 
substantively in terms of the role that the Court played. Chevron 
embraced a type of “counter-Marbury” that envisions judicial 
restraint,83 whereas Massachusetts seems to embrace a more searching 
and active judiciary. Of course, the irony of all this is that the work of 
one man, Stevens, could be cited by litigants seeking a deferential, 
 
 81 For a general discussion of the role Massachusetts might play in speaking to the 
issue of what kinds of extrastatuory factors agencies can take into account when 
making decisions, see Richard J. Pierce, What Factors Can an Agency Consider in 
Making a Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 81 (“I have no doubt that many 
petitioners will argue that Massachusetts . . . stand[s] for the proposition that 
congressional silence with respect to a decisional factor should be interpreted as 
congressional rejection of that factor and as a prohibition on agency consideration of 
that factor in making decisions.”); see also Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for 
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 50-52 (2009) (discussing 
how Massachusetts could be read to limit types of extrastatutory factors that agencies 
consider but arguing that this is not best reading of Massachusetts). 
 82 See Cass, supra note 12, at 82 (arguing that Court in Massachusetts “put on the 
mantle of climatologists-in-chief, second-guessing every consideration that supports 
the positions taken by the EPA”). 
 83 See, e.g., Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 28, at 189 (arguing that Chevron went 
“so far as to create a kind of counter-Marbury”); see also Richard W. Murphy, A “New” 
Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 37 (2004) (noting “tension between the Marbury norm that [courts] 
control legal meaning and the Chevron norm that agencies control policymaking, 
which in turn, sometimes controls legal meaning”). 
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restrained judiciary as well as by litigants seeking a more active and 
protective judiciary. This leaves one wondering whether there is some 
explanation for these seemingly inconsistent decisions.  
II. RECONCILING CHEVRON AND MASSACHUSETTS 
This Part identifies and considers three possible explanations for the 
apparent differences between the two decisions: (1) that Justice 
Stevens is willing to embrace a less deferential and more active judicial 
role in cases involving major social issues, such as global warming; (2) 
that Justice Stevens never meant what Chevron has been read to mean 
over time; or (3) that Justice Stevens’s strong commitment to 
interpretive purposivism dictates that he apply a different analysis to 
every statutory scheme to best effectuate Congress’s animating 
purposes and goals.84 This Part ultimately concludes that the third 
explanation, resting on Justice Stevens’s purposivist approach, is the 
most useful in reconciling differences between Massachusetts and 
Chevron. This suggests that Justice Stevens will not embrace a more 
“active” or more “protective” judicial role simply because a case 
presents a major social issue like global warming, but he will pay 
particular attention to Congress’s own protective goals and purposes 
when reviewing agency action. As such, it seems that he will seek to 
ensure that agencies act in a way that furthers Congress’s view of what 
will best secure and protect the public interest.  
A. Theory One: Major Social Issues Require More Active Judicial 
Intervention 
One possible explanation for the differences between Chevron and 
Massachusetts could simply be that Massachusetts presented a highly 
charged, political issue that had major ramifications for global 
environmental security.85 Under this theory, perhaps Justice Stevens in 
 
 84 A fourth possible explanation worth mentioning might simply be that over 
time, Justice Stevens’s style, approach, and views have changed. In other words, 
sometime between Chevron being decided in 1984 and Massachusetts being handed 
down in 2007, perhaps Justice Stevens’s views on deference and judicial review have 
changed. Although this is possible, it seems unlikely to adequately explain the 
apparent tension between Chevron and Massachusetts. Justice Stevens, after all, has 
spoken publicly about Chevron on multiple occasions, see Merrill, supra note 8, at 420 
n.76, and although he has suggested that he did not expect the case to turn into a 
blockbuster, see id., he has never suggested that he now disagrees with what he wrote 
in the case.  
 85 Cf. Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 11, at 1043 (“Perhaps the Court’s 
willingness to apply such rigorous review is limited to the specifics of this case, 
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Massachusetts was willing to ignore Chevron’s rule of deference (or at 
least to “soft pedal” Chevron, as one scholar has put it)86 because the 
magnitude of the evils of global warming convinced Justice Stevens 
that the judiciary had to play an active role in securing the public 
interest where the Executive Branch had dragged its heels and failed to 
act. In other words, Justice Stevens may have felt that the Executive 
Branch had delayed long enough and that it was time for the judiciary 
to send a clear message about the need for the executive to address 
this major environmental issue.  
Articulating a similar take on Massachusetts, Professor Ronald Cass 
has argued that the justices in the majority ran roughshod over 
administrative law principles, such as Chevron deference, in order to 
promote their own political preferences.87 Specifically, Professor Cass 
charged that the Justices “stretch[ed], twist[ed], and torture[d] 
administrative law doctrines” in their “eagerness to promote 
government action.”88 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in 
Massachusetts, Justice Scalia engaged in a related attack, suggesting 
that the majority had improperly “substitute[ed] its own desired 
outcome for the reasoned judgment of the responsible agency” due to 
the importance of the underlying policy issues at stake.89  
Although it is certainly possible that Justice Stevens’s concerns 
about the tremendous significance of global warming led him to take 
on a more active judicial role and to espouse heightened 
environmental awareness in Massachusetts, this possibility alone does 
not adequately explain the significant differences between 
Massachusetts and Chevron. Chevron, after all, also involved a very 
significant environmental issue: national air pollution control.90 Yet, as 
Professor Kenneth Manaster has pointed out, Chevron, unlike 
Massachusetts, “was decided without any direct analysis of the 
environmental questions it raised.”91 
 
namely the immense importance of global warming.”).  
 86 DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 2006-2007, at 
xiv (Jeffrey S. Lubbers ed., 2008) (noting that Chevron was “soft-pedaled” in 
Massachusetts).  
 87 See Cass, supra note 12, at 75 (“In their eagerness to promote government 
action to address global warming, the Justices stretch, twist, and torture administrative 
law doctrines to avoid the inconvenient truth that this is not a matter on which judges 
have any real role to play.”).  
 88 Id.  
 89 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 560 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 90 See Manaster, supra note 28, at 1965 (noting that Chevron involved “issues of 
tremendous significance for air pollution control across the country”).  
 91 See id.  
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Furthermore, Justice Stevens repeatedly has made clear that he 
avoids deciding cases based on his own policy preferences.92 For 
example, in Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of 
Education,93 a 2007 case involving the permissibility of the Secretary of 
Education’s interpretation of a statute, Justice Stevens stated the 
following in response to concerns raised by Justice Scalia that judicial 
departures from statutory text might represent policy-driven 
interpretations:  
Justice Scalia’s argument today rests on the incorrect premise 
that every policy-driven interpretation implements a judge’s 
personal view of sound policy, rather than a faithful attempt to 
carry out the will of the legislature. Quite the contrary is true 
of the work of the judges with whom I have worked for many 
years. If we presume that our judges are intellectually honest 
— as I do — there is no reason to fear “policy-driven 
interpretation[s]” of Acts of Congress.94 
Obviously, the fact that Justice Stevens repeatedly says in cases like 
Zuni that he avoids deciding cases based on his own policy preferences 
does not necessarily make the statement true. But there is ample 
evidence to support his statements. Professor Manaster, for example, 
has thoroughly detailed how Justice Stevens has disappointed 
environmentalists by refusing to alter his judicial approach in 
environmental cases simply to achieve environmental protection.95 
According to Professor Manaster, Justice Stevens routinely approaches 
 
 92 See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 107 (2007) 
(“The only ‘policy’ by which I have been driven is that which this Court has endorsed 
on repeated occasions regarding the importance of remaining faithful to Congress’ 
intent.”); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 799 n.8 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting that he was implementing Congress’ policy choices, not his own); 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(“Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the 
basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences.”); see also Manaster, supra note 28, at 
1993 & nn.148-49 (quoting Justice Stevens as saying that he has decided cases as 
judge in ways that conflict with his own personal “views as to what would be most 
advantageous or desirable in our modern day society”).  
 93 550 U.S. 81.  
 94 Id. at 105 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 107 (“The only ‘policy’ by 
which I have been driven is that which this Court has endorsed on repeated occasions 
regarding the importance of remaining faithful to Congress’ intent.”).  
 95 See Manaster, supra note 28, at 1965-66, 2001 (“[W]hen regulatory actions of 
environmental and other types of agencies are subjected to judicial review, there is no 
reason to expect that Justice Stevens’s emphatic rejection of a policy making role for 
judges will be diluted or ignored.”).  
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environmental cases through general doctrines of administrative law 
and statutory interpretation instead of bending his judicial approach 
to protect the environment.96 
Specifically, Professor Manaster has pointed to Justice Stevens’s 
dissenting opinion in City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund97 
as an example of a case in which Justice Stevens might have felt that 
what the “law authorized” was “divorced from” his own judgment.98 
In City of Chicago, the majority in an opinion by Justice Scalia held 
that ash generated by Chicago’s incineration of solid waste was subject 
to a scheme governing hazardous waste set up by the Resource 
Conservation Recovery Act (“RCRA”). In dissent, Justice Stevens 
stated that he would have deferred to the EPA and reached a contrary 
conclusion.99 He conceded that “[t]he majority’s decision today may 
represent sound policy” because “[r]equiring cities to spend the 
necessary funds to dispose of their incinerator residues in accordance 
with the strict requirements of [RCRA] will provide additional 
protections to the environment.”100 However, he noted that “the 
conservation of scarce landfill space and the encouragement of the 
recovery of energy and valuable materials in municipal wastes were 
major concerns motivating RCRA’s enactment” as well.101 According to 
Justice Stevens, it was up to the EPA, not to the Court, to decide 
“[w]hether those purposes will be disserved by regulating municipal 
incinerators under Subtitle C [of RCRA] and, if so, whether 
environmental benefits may nevertheless justify the costs of such 
additional regulation.”102  
Hence, in light of both Chevron’s and Massachusetts’s involvement in 
pressing environmental issues and in light of cases like City of 
Chicago, it seems tough to square Massachusetts and Chevron solely by 
noting that Massachusetts involved a highly significant environmental 
issue. Other possible explanations for the apparent tension between 
Chevron and Massachusetts must be explored as well.  
 
 96 Id. at 1965-66. 
 97 511 U.S. 328 (1994). 
 98 See Manaster, supra note 28, at 1993 n.149. 
 99 City of Chicago, 511 U.S. at 348 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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B. Theory Two: Justice Stevens Does Not Believe that Chevron Means 
What It Has Been Read to Mean 
Another possible and perhaps more promising way of explaining the 
differences between Massachusetts and Chevron would be to say that 
Justice Stevens never meant to say what Chevron has been read to 
mean as time has passed. Since being decided in 1984, Chevron 
certainly has taken on a life of its own, morphing into a mandatory 
rule of deference that legal scholars have read to shift significant 
interpretive power from the courts to agencies.103 Chevron’s rule of 
deference also has grown in complexity — consisting, for example, 
not only of the step one and step two inquiries, but now also of a “step 
zero” inquiry, which focuses on whether or not Chevron is applicable 
in a certain case and thus operates as a kind of on/off switch for 
Chevron deference.104  
Justice Stevens, a fan of flexible standards rather than rigid rules,105 
has not hidden the fact that he has serious reservations about the 
broad, mandatory reading of Chevron that has taken hold over the 
years.106 Immediately after the Chevron decision, for example, Justice 
Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,107 
in which he debated the scope of Chevron with Justice Scalia, a strong 
supporter of Chevron deference. Cardoza-Fonseca involved a pure 
 
 103 See generally Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 28, at 188-89 (“[S]hortly after it 
appeared, Chevron was quickly taken to establish a new approach to judicial review of 
agency interpretations of law, going so far as to create a kind of counter-Marbury for 
the administrative state.”); Watts, Adapting, supra note 23, at 998 (“[T]he Court’s 
decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council effected a dramatic 
reallocation in authority between the branches, shifting significant power from the 
judicial branch and handing it over to administrative agencies.”). 
 104 See Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 28, at 190-91 (discussing step zero inquiry, 
which involves question of whether Chevron applies at all); see also Cass, supra note 
12, at 81 (noting that Chevron’s development has “enough twists and turns for a 
slalom run”). 
 105 Cf. Norman Dorsen, John Paul Stevens, 1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xxv, xxvi (stating 
that Stevens “eschews bright-line rules in favor of standards that permit judges 
adequate discretion to tailor results to nuanced evaluation of facts and 
circumstances”); Stevens, Random Recollections, supra note 23, at 270 (noting that in 
context of working on committee charged with endorsing rules that would apply to all 
statutes including antitrust exemption, his committee ultimately recommended not 
bright-line rule or set of rules, “but a recommendation to read each federal regulatory 
statute with great care because each provides its own solutions to the specific 
problems that Congress confronted”).  
 106 Cf. Merrill, supra note 8, at 420-21 (describing how Stevens did not desire to 
alter status quo when he wrote Chevron); see also Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 28, at 
188 n.2.  
 107 480 U.S. 421 (1987).  
  
2010] From Chevron to Massachusetts 1045 
question of law: whether the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
required the Attorney General to use the same or different standards of 
proof when evaluating requests for withholding deportation and 
requests for asylum.108 In the course of his opinion, Justice Stevens 
strongly implied that Chevron deference does not apply broadly to all 
questions of statutory ambiguity, but rather applies only where 
questions of law application or implementation are involved, as 
opposed to pure questions of law.109 Because Justice Stevens viewed 
the question whether Congress intended the standards governing 
asylum and deportation “to be identical” as a “pure question of 
statutory interpretation,” he deemed it a question for the courts, not 
the agency, to decide.110 Accordingly, Justice Stevens seems to have 
tried to make clear in Cardoza-Fonseca that not all statutory 
ambiguities call for Chevron deference to agencies. Rather, Congress 
intends some kinds of statutory ambiguities to be resolved by the 
courts.  
Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence in Cardoza-Fonseca in which he 
agreed that the agency’s interpretation was not entitled to deference 
because its interpretation of the relevant standard was “clearly 
inconsistent” with the INA.111 Justice Scalia, however, took issue with 
Justice Stevens’s attempts to paint Chevron in a narrow light. Justice 
Scalia argued that the Court’s discussion of Chevron was “flatly 
inconsistent” with the broad rule of deference set forth in Chevron.112 
In particular, Justice Scalia contended that the issue in Chevron turned 
on a question of “abstract interpretation” (i.e., a pure question of law 
involving the meaning of the term “stationary source”) rather than a 
question of law application. Hence, according to Justice Scalia, 
Chevron cannot be read to embrace the dichotomy between questions 
of law application and pure questions of statutory interpretation as 
suggested by Justice Stevens.113  
 
 108 See id. at 423.  
 109 See Merrill, supra note 8, at 421; see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 454 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Court “implies that courts may substitute their 
interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever they face ‘a pure question of 
statutory construction for the courts to decide’ ”).  
 110 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446. Having concluded that the standards for 
withholding deportation and asylum were not the same under the statute and that a 
“well-founded fear” statute applied to review requests for asylum, Justice Stevens did 
note that it would be up to the agency to give the “well-founded fear” standard 
meaning through actual application. Id. at 448.  
 111 Id. at 453-54 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 454-55. For a detailed discussion of the debate between Justice Scalia and 
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Despite Justice Scalia’s claim that Chevron applies across the board 
regardless of whether a question of law or law application is involved, 
Justice Stevens apparently still believes that the dichotomy between 
pure questions of law and questions of law application has relevance 
in the Chevron context. Most recently, in the 2009 Negusie v. Holder 
decision, Justice Stevens wrote a partial concurrence and partial 
dissent in which he again expressed his view that pure questions of 
statutory “construction” are reserved for the courts to decide, even if 
the statute is not entirely clear, whereas questions of statutory 
“implementation” or “application” are reserved for agencies.114 Negusie 
involved the question whether the so-called “persecutor bar,” which 
bars an alien from seeking asylum if he has persecuted others, applies 
even if the alien’s involvement in persecution was the product of 
coercion or duress.115 According to Justice Stevens, the case’s narrow 
question of statutory interpretation was for the Court, not the agency, 
to decide.116 He distinguished Chevron as a question of statutory 
implementation, noting that “[c]ourts are expert at statutory 
construction, while agencies are expert at statutory 
implementation.”117 Thus, Justice Stevens again expressed his 
discomfort with applying Chevron broadly to all cases involving 
agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities, suggesting that courts 
should save Chevron deference for agency constructions that turn on 
agency policy expertise.  
Perhaps Justice Stevens’s clearly articulated desire to cabin rather 
than to expand Chevron reveals why in Massachusetts he was willing to 
shy away from Chevron’s deferential approach in determining the 
meaning of section 202(a)’s use of the word “judgment.”118 By this 
account, one could argue that Justice Stevens may have viewed 
Massachusetts as presenting a pure question of statutory interpretation 
 
Justice Stevens in Cardoza-Fonseca, see Bernard Schwartz, “Shooting the Piano Player”? 
Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 46-50 (1995). 
 114 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1171-73 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part) (“The Chevron framework thus accounts for the different 
institutional competencies of agencies and courts: Courts are experts at statutory 
construction, while agencies are expert at statutory implementation.”). It is notable 
that Justice Breyer, one of the Court’s administrative law experts, joined Justice 
Stevens in Negusie.  
 115 Id. at 1159. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, ultimately holding 
that the statute was ambiguous and that the agency’s interpretation was not entitled to 
deference because it was based on an erroneous understanding of a court decision. Id.  
 116 Id. at 1170 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 117 Id. at 1171.  
 118 See supra Part I.B.  
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for the courts to decide — namely, whether section 202(a) required 
the EPA to make a “judgment” about whether the pollutants pose a 
danger, or whether section 202(a) enabled the EPA to decline to make 
a “judgment” based on policy considerations.119 If Justice Stevens 
viewed the issue in this way, then he may well have felt that 
Massachusetts, like Cardoza-Fonseca and Negusie, posed a pure 
question of statutory interpretation involving the metes and bounds of 
what the agency was legally required to do, not the kind of technical 
question of statutory implementation that Chevron raised that called 
for deference to the expert agency due to its exercise of policy 
expertise. 
Although this explanation for why Justice Stevens jumped over 
Chevron in his discussion of the “judgment” issue in Massachusetts is 
certainly plausible, it does not seem entirely satisfactory because the 
EPA in Massachusetts did not engage in pure statutory construction on 
the “judgment” issue, but rather seems to have decided a policy 
question involving whether the EPA should or should not regulate. 
Specifically, the EPA argued that a variety of discretionary, policy-
driven considerations (such as scientific uncertainty and Presidential 
foreign policy initiatives) persuaded it to decline to make a judgment 
about whether certain emissions pose a danger.120 In other words, the 
EPA did not purport to be engaging in traditional statutory 
construction, but rather seems to have been engaged in public 
administration aimed at deciding as a policy matter, rather than a legal 
matter, whether or not regulation was called for at that particular time. 
This kind of public administration would seem to call for the 
application of Chevron,121 even under Justice Steven’s approach to 
Chevron deference since Justice Stevens views Chevron as being 
applicable when an agency renders a construction that implicates its 
policy expertise.122  
 
 119 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006); see also supra Part I.B.  
 120 See supra Part I.B.  
 121 If Justice Stevens had applied Chevron to the “judgment” issue, it seems that the 
relevant questions under Chevron would have been: (1) whether Congress 
unambiguously stated which factors the EPA could consider in deciding whether to 
make a “judgment,” and (2) if not, whether the EPA’s interpretation of the factors that 
it could consider was reasonable. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 551-53 
(2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Chevron’s applicability). 
 122 In Negusie, for example, Justice Stevens explained that deference had been 
warranted in Chevron because Chevron did not involve a pure question of statutory 
construction. There, the EPA “cast its activity not as statutory construction but as 
public administration; its rulemaking sought to achieve policy goals, such as reducing 
regulatory complexity and promoting plant modernization.” Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 
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Indeed, in another case decided in 2009, Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper, Inc.,123 Justice Stevens seemed to concede that Chevron’s 
two-step framework was relevant to determining what factors govern 
an agency’s regulatory approach when Congress is silent.124 In Entergy, 
the Justices divided in a case involving a CWA provision directing the 
EPA to require that certain water intake structures “reflect the best 
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”125 
The relevant statutory provision said nothing express about whether 
“cost” was a relevant factor that the EPA could consider in making 
decisions. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia read Congress’s silence 
about the propriety of considering “cost” to mean that the EPA, 
relying upon Chevron deference, could reasonably conclude that a 
cost-benefit analysis was an appropriate decisional factor. Specifically, 
Justice Scalia explained that he read Congress’s silence in the relevant 
statute “to convey nothing more than a refusal to tie the agency’s 
hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used, and if so to 
what degree.”126 
In contrast, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter and Justice 
Ginsburg in dissent, contended that the provision’s silence about the 
relevance of cost should not be read “as an implicit source of cost-
benefit authority, particularly when such authority is elsewhere 
expressly granted” in other statutory provisions.127 In arguing that 
Congress actually “intend[ed] to control, not delegate when cost-
benefit analysis” could be used,128 Justice Stevens took issue with 
Justice Scalia’s failure to consider, at step one of Chevron, the 
possibility that Congress’s silence was meant to foreclose a cost-benefit 
analysis.129 However, he did not appear to take issue with Chevron’s 
applicability in Entergy. In other words, he did not suggest that the 
case presented an issue of pure statutory “construction” to which 
Chevron was wholly inapplicable. Rather, he affirmatively cited 
Chevron, and he seems to have decided the case at step one of Chevron, 
ultimately reaching a different conclusion than Justice Scalia about the 
clarity of Congress’s intent.130 
 
1171 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 123 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).  
 124 Id. at 1518 & n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 125 See id. at 1516; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).  
 126 Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1508.  
 127 Id. at 1517 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 128 Id. at 1518. 
 129 Id. at 1518 n.5.  
 130 Id. at 1518.  
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Given that Massachusetts presented the very same kind of issue as 
Entergy (namely, the question of what factors the EPA can consider in 
administering a statute that is silent about relevant decisional factors), 
Justice Stevens’s implicit acceptance of Chevron’s framework in Entergy 
could be read to suggest that he likewise should have applied Chevron 
in Massachusetts with respect to the “judgment” issue. And yet he did 
not. Hence, it does not seem entirely satisfying to say that his 
willingness to skip over Chevron’s framework in Massachusetts with 
respect to the “judgment” issue can be easily explained simply by 
pointing to his overall desire to limit Chevron to those cases that turn 
on questions of statutory application rather than statutory 
interpretation.  
C. Theory Three: Every Statutory Scheme Requires a Different Analysis 
Designed to Effectuate Congress’s Unique Purposes and Goals 
A third way to reconcile Justice Stevens’s opinions in Massachusetts 
and Chevron is to consider Justice Stevens’s strong commitment to 
purposivism — meaning his adherence to a method of statutory 
interpretation that calls on judges to determine a statute’s original 
purpose and to interpret the statute in light of that purpose.131 Justice 
Stevens currently stands as one of the Court’s most staunch 
proponents of using a purposivist interpretive method of statutory 
construction.132 As Professor John Manning has put it, purposivists, 
like Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, believe “that legislation is a 
purposive act, and that judges should interpret acts of Congress to 
implement the legislative purpose, even if doing so requires some 
deviation from the semantic detail of the enacted text.”133 The 
purposivist approach is typically contrasted with textualism, which 
“gives precedence to a statute’s semantic meaning, when clear, and 
eschews reliance on legislative history or other indicia of background 
 
 131 See generally Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory 
Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better 
than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1996) (“[P]urposivists go 
beyond the legislature’s original intent to estimate the statute’s spirit or purpose 
because either it may be difficult to determine the statute’s original intent or a court 
must apply a statute to circumstances that the enacting legislature did not foresee.”).  
 132 See supra note 15. Justice Breyer is another strong supporter of purposivism. 
See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2342-43 
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 133 See Manning, supra note 15, at 2009-10 (“For Justice Stevens, respect for 
Congress means fidelity to that purpose rather than to the often-faulty semantic 
details of whatever text it happened to adopt.”). 
  
1050 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:1021 
purpose to vary the conventional meaning of the text.”134 Textualists, 
like Justice Scalia, criticize purposivism’s attempt to find the collective 
intent or purpose of the legislature because “legislatures usually have 
no determinate collective expectations about many (if any) of the 
concrete issues posed by their statutes.”135  
Despite recent momentum in favor of textualism (including Justice 
Scalia’s elevation from the D.C. Circuit to the Supreme Court in 
1986), Justice Stevens remains highly committed to purposivism.136 As 
a longstanding champion of purposivism, Justice Stevens seeks to 
interpret statutes to implement Congress’s original purposes and 
goals.137 Justice Stevens’s seemingly divergent opinions in 
Massachusetts and Chevron, accordingly, might be explained by 
considering the simple fact that the cases involved different provisions 
of the CAA, each with its own history and its own animating 
congressional purposes.  
In Chevron, Justice Stevens made clear that Congress was driven by 
two competing purposes when it enacted the amendments containing 
the permit program at issue in the case: the economic interest in 
permitting capital improvements to continue and the environmental 
interest in improving air quality.138 Because Congress did not clearly 
answer how these competing interests should be balanced, and 
because the EPA reached a result that sought to navigate these two 
competing interests,139 Justice Stevens, as a purposivist, seems to have 
 
 134 Id. at 2010.  
 135 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 642 
(1990). Because Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens adhere to very different interpretive 
methods, they often disagree when it comes to cases raising questions of statutory 
interpretation. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why 
It Matters: Statutory Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain 
Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955 (2005) (comparing approaches of Justices 
Stevens and Scalia). 
 136 This Article does not seek to take a position on the advantages or disadvantages 
of purposivism vis-à-vis textualism. That debate has received thorough attention 
elsewhere. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 135 (discussing traditional approach to 
statutory interpretation, as well as describing “new textualism” approach embraced by 
Scalia); Manning, supra note 15 (contrasting Scalia’s textualist approach and Stevens’s 
purposivist approach). Rather, this Article seeks to analyze how Justice Stevens’s 
commitment to purposivism might help to reconcile his opinions in Chevron and 
Massachusetts and what, if anything, his commitment to purposivism says about his 
view of the proper judicial role in cases impacting the public’s health, welfare, and 
safety.  
 137 See Manning, supra note 15, at 2009; see also Greene, supra note 15, at 1913. 
 138 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851-52 
(1984).  
 139 Id. at 865. 
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felt comfortable deferring to the agency and taking a hands-off judicial 
role. In other words, deference seemed appropriate to him because the 
EPA’s “interpretation represent[ed] a reasonable accommodation” of 
the “manifestly competing interests” that Congress had in mind when 
creating the permit program.140  
In contrast, in Massachusetts, although Justice Stevens focused 
rather narrowly (and perhaps uncharacteristically) on the statute’s text 
instead of on section 202(a)’s general purposes, one can tease out of his 
opinion a general concern for furthering the statute’s main protective 
purpose: protection from harm resulting from air pollutants. For 
example, Justice Stevens was unconcerned that Congress “might not 
have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to 
global warming” because he concluded that Congress had used broad 
language in the statute in order to confer the “flexibility” needed to 
ensure that “changing circumstances and scientific developments” 
would not render the CAA obsolete.141 In other words, Justice Stevens 
seems to have believed that Congress drafted section 202(a)(1) with 
some breadth in order to ensure that the CAA’s spirit would be served 
even as circumstances changed and new developments occurred.142 
Viewed in this light, it seems that what bothered Justice Stevens about 
the EPA’s reading of the term “air pollutant” in section 202(a) was 
that it was too narrow and too cramped given the overarching 
statutory purpose.143 Accordingly, Justice Stevens may have felt 
comfortable interpreting the statutory term “air pollutant” in a way 
that would ensure that the EPA could not undermine Congress’s 
protective purpose of ensuring that the public health and welfare are 
protected.144 
Similarly, Justice Stevens’s nondeferential treatment of the other 
merits issue in Massachusetts — namely, whether the EPA had the 
statutory authority to decline to make a judgment based on policy 
considerations — also makes sense when considered in light of his 
purposivist leanings. Imagine that Justice Stevens had read section 
202(a) to allow the EPA to rely upon policy reasons wholly 
unconnected to the statute in declining to make a judgment about 
 
 140 Id. (“Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself 
on the level of specificity presented by these cases.”).  
 141 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. (noting that EPA has been charged with protecting public’s “health” and 
“welfare” and discussing how Congress used capacious terms to ensure that Act would 
have regulatory flexibility to handle changing circumstances and scientific 
developments).  
 144 See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)). 
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whether or not carbon dioxide emissions endanger the public health 
and welfare. If he had adopted such an expansive reading of the 
statute, then the EPA might fairly easily have been able to forever 
postpone making the endangerment judgment foreseen by section 
202(a). In this sense, as Professors Jody Freeman and Adrian 
Vermeule have aptly explained, the EPA might have been able to 
“circumvent” the statutory provision’s very purpose of ensuring that 
the EPA actually makes judgments about the health and welfare effects 
of air pollutants.145 From the perspective of a purposivist who is 
concerned with interpreting statutes in ways that will effectuate 
Congress’s main goals, one can see why Justice Stevens would not 
have been eager to read section 202(a) to allow this result. According 
to Professors Freeman and Vermeule, a purposivist might think it 
“absurd for the statute to require strong, and tightly constrained, first-
order judgment about pollution’s effects on health and welfare while 
conferring unbounded discretion on EPA to decide never to make 
such judgments.”146 
Hence, under this view, it seems likely that Chevron and 
Massachusetts reach different results, strike different tones, and send 
different messages about the judicial role simply because they involved 
different provisions of the CAA that were motivated by different 
congressional purposes. In Chevron, Congress had not definitively 
resolved how the struggle between two competing interests should be 
reconciled, so Justice Stevens embraced a narrow, highly deferential 
judicial role to allow the EPA, rather than an unelected judiciary, to 
resolve the struggle between competing interests.147 In contrast, in 
Massachusetts, Justice Stevens may have believed that Congress’s basic 
goal embodied in the relevant statutory provision was clear: to protect 
the public health and welfare from air pollutants.148 Justice Stevens, 
accordingly, may not have seen a need in Massachusetts to defer to the 
 
 145 See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 77, at 85 (arguing that Justice Stevens’s 
opinion in Massachusetts might be explained by “anticircumvention principle,” which 
calls on courts to interpret statutes “so as not to allow circumvention of a statute’s 
main provisions”). Professor Jack Beermann has reached a similar conclusion, arguing 
that the Court in Massachusetts — even though it may have gotten it wrong — “was 
doing its best to work with Congress to achieve the congressional goals embodied in 
the statute rather than advance an agenda unrelated to those policies.” Jack M. 
Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727, 742 
(2009).  
 146 See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 77, at 86.  
 147 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837, 859-63 
(1984).  
 148 Cf. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).  
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EPA, which adopted a statutory construction that flouted Congress’s 
main purpose. 
Put another way, Justice Stevens seems to have concluded that the 
EPA in Massachusetts was essentially thumbing its nose at Congress’s 
protective goals and hence had to lose at step one of Chevron. By 
contrast, the EPA in Chevron was doing its best to reconcile two 
competing interests contemplated but not resolved by Congress and 
hence deserved deference at step two of Chevron.149 
III. A PROTECTOR OF CONGRESS’S VIEW OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The picture just painted of how Massachusetts and Chevron can be 
reconciled suggests that Justice Stevens cannot accurately be labeled as 
the proponent of an active, protective judiciary (à la Massachusetts) or 
a highly deferential, hands-off judiciary (à la Chevron). Rather, as a 
strong purposivist, he strives to ensure that agencies act to effectuate 
Congress’s own animating purposes. In doing so, however, many of 
Justice Stevens’s decisions seem to pay particularly close attention to 
protective and remedial purposes set by Congress. As a result, 
although Justice Stevens expressly eschews deciding cases based on his 
own policy preferences, his purposivist approach to statutory 
interpretation does seem to enable him to give agencies the leeway 
they need to facilitate broad protective or remedial goals set by 
Congress,150 and conversely to check agencies when they act counter 
to Congress’s overarching protective or remedial purposes.151  
 
 149 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing two competing purposes).  
 150 Cf. Diane L. Hughes, Note, Justice Stevens’s Method of Statutory Interpretation: A 
Well-Tailored Means for Facilitating Environmental Regulation, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
493, 497 (1995) (arguing that “Justice Stevens’s method of statutory analysis in the 
environmental context is superior to rigid textualism in satisfying the purposes of 
environmental regulation”). 
 151 In this sense, the conclusions reached here might help to explain Professor 
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer’s recent finding that Justice Stevens is the third 
least deferential justice of 17 recent justices they studied. See William N. Eskridge & 
Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1154 (2008). As Professor 
Eskridge and Baer noted, it is a bit ironic that the very author of Chevron stands as the 
“third least deferential justice,” id., but they hint that Justice Stevens’s failure to 
consistently defer might be explained by his “general philosophy of strictly enforcing 
congressional expectations and constitutional norms against agencies.” Id. 
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A. Reading Congressional Purposes and Remedial Goals Broadly 
Some specific examples should easily demonstrate Justice Stevens’s 
willingness to read protective or remedial congressional purposes 
broadly in the context of reviewing agency action. Consider, for 
example, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Solid Waste Agency of Northern 
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), a 2001 
decision involving whether the Army Corps of Engineers could 
exercise jurisdiction under the CWA over abandoned sand and gravel 
pits that provide habitat for migratory birds.152 In an opinion by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, the Court read the Corps’ jurisdiction narrowly and 
refused to extend the Corps’ jurisdiction to areas not adjacent to 
navigable water.153 In reaching this conclusion, the Court mentioned 
that Congress passed the CWA “for the stated purpose of ‘restor[ing] 
and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the Nation’s waters.’ ”154 Yet as one commentator has pointed out, the 
Court ultimately “gave little interpretive weight to the CWA’s broad 
remedial purpose.”155 
In contrast, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens (joined by 
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) looked to Congress’s animating 
remedial purpose and argued for a broad reading of the CWA, noting 
that Congress sought to protect “the quality of our Nation’s waters for 
esthetic, health, recreational, and environmental uses.”156 Justice 
Stevens also noted that the “major purpose” of the CWA was “to 
establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of 
water pollution.”157 Citing Chevron, Justice Stevens ultimately 
concluded that the “Corps’ interpretation of the statute as extending 
beyond navigable waters, tributaries of navigable waters, and wetlands 
adjacent each is manifestly reasonable and therefore entitled to 
deference.”158 According to Justice Stevens, the majority, in reaching a 
contrary conclusion, had “needlessly weaken[ed] our principal 
 
 152 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 162-63 (2001).  
 153 Id. at 168. 
 154 Id. at 166 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)).  
 155 Courtney Covington, Note, Rapanos v. United States: Evaluating the Efficacy of 
Textualism in Interpreting Environmental Laws, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 801, 809 (2007). 
 156 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175, 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Covington, 
supra note 155, at 810 (“Stevens’ willingness to consider Congressional purpose and 
intent allowed him to conclude that an interpretation of the Corps’ jurisdiction that 
covers the ponds at issue in SWANCC is consistent with the CWA.”).  
 157 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 158 Id. at 192.  
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safeguard against toxic water” and had done violence to Congress’s 
chosen protective scheme.159  
Another useful example of Justice Stevens’s willingness to read 
protective statutes broadly (and to respect agencies’ protective 
readings of such statutes) can be found in Justice Stevens’s dissenting 
opinion in Rapanos v. United States, a 2006 case that asked whether the 
CWA’s protections extended to certain wetlands.160 A plurality of the 
Court led by Justice Scalia, following a textualist approach, read the 
CWA narrowly, concluding that the Corps’s expansive interpretation 
of the phrase “waters of the United States” is not based on a 
permissible construction of the statute and hence did not merit 
Chevron deference.161 In contrast, Justice Stevens (joined again by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter) dissented by stating that the 
Army Corps’ determination that certain wetlands are encompassed 
within the CWA was reasonable and hence called for Chevron 
deference. Specifically, Justice Stevens concluded that “[t]he 
Corps’ . . . decision to treat these wetlands as encompassed within the 
term ‘waters of the United States’ is a quintessential example of the 
Executive’s reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision.”162 
Justice Stevens acknowledged in Rapanos that his ultimate 
conclusion was influenced by policy considerations, but he made clear 
that the pro-environmental “policy considerations” that influenced his 
thinking were “Congress’ rather than his own.”163 Specifically, Justice 
Stevens stated that he sought to effectuate Congress’s broad goal of 
“protecting the physical, chemical and biological integrity of our 
waters.”164 Hence, Justice Scalia’s textualist approach served to 
constrain the CWA, whereas Justice Stevens’s purposivist approach 
enabled him to read Congress’s protective goals and purposes broadly 
so that he could defer to the agency’s reasonable reading of the 
statute.165 Justice Stevens’s approach, accordingly, sought to enable the 
 
 159 Id. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 191 (arguing that it is 
“majority’s reading, not the agency’s, that does violence to the scheme Congress chose 
to put into place”).  
 160 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 719-20 (2006).  
 161 Id. at 716 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas & 
Alito, JJ.). 
 162 Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).  
 163 Id. at 798 n.8.  
 164 Id. He then cited Chevron for the proposition that Congress’s policy concerns 
are relevant to determining whether the agency regulation is permissible. See id.  
 165 See Covington, supra note 155, at 817-33 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s textualist 
approach serves to constrain CWA in way that undermines its main purpose).  
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agency to resolve any ambiguity in the statute in favor of the 
environmental interests that the statute was designed to protect.  
Yet another helpful example of how Justice Stevens’s purposivist 
approach enables him to give particular attention to Congress’s broad 
protective purposes is his opinion in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Greater Oregon, a 1995 decision involving the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).166 The issue was whether the 
Secretary of the Interior exceeded his authority under the ESA in 
promulgating a regulation that defined the statute’s prohibition on 
takings to include “significant habitat modification or degradation 
where it actually kills or injures wildlife.”167 In upholding the 
regulation’s broad definition of the ESA’s prohibition on “taking” 
endangered or threatened species, Justice Stevens relied in part on 
what he labeled the “broad purpose” of the ESA: “[T]he broad purpose 
of the ESA supports the Secretary’s decision to extend protection 
against activities that cause the precise harms Congress enacted the 
statute to avoid.”168 He noted that among the central purposes of the 
ESA was “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which 
endangered species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved,”169 and he highlighted the Court’s previous description of 
the ESA as “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of 
endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”170 In light of 
“Congress’ clear expression of the ESA’s broad purpose to protect 
endangered and threatened wildlife,” Justice Stevens concluded that 
the Secretary’s broad definition was “reasonable” and warranted 
deference.171  
A final illustrative example of Justice Stevens’s willingness to draw 
on Congress’s own broad protective purposes is his dissenting opinion 
in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., a case involving the question 
whether myopic job applicants were disabled within the meaning of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).172 Each of the three 
executive agencies charged with administering the ADA had 
concluded that it mandates that “the presence of disability turns on an 
 
 166 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 
(1995). 
 167 Id. at 690.  
 168 Id. at 698. 
 169 Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994)).  
 170 Id. (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).  
 171 Id. at 700. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in the case joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas in which he took a textualist approach. Id. at 
717 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 172 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475-77 (1999).  
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individual’s uncorrected state.”173 Yet the majority, in an opinion 
written by Justice O’Connor, held that myopic applicants were not 
disabled under the ADA because the applicants could correct their 
visual impairment with corrective lenses.174 Arguing in dissent that the 
job applicants should be entitled to the ADA’s protections, Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, stressed that the Court’s task should 
be to interpret the statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to 
serve.175 Congress’s central purpose in the ADA was clear to Justice 
Stevens: Congress meant the ADA “to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.”176 In order to be faithful to the 
ADA’s remedial purpose, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should 
give the ADA “a generous, rather than a miserly, construction.”177  
As these various examples illustrate, if an agency reads a statute 
narrowly despite Congress’s broad protective or remedial goals, then 
Justice Stevens may well refuse to defer to the agency’s views. 
Massachusetts serves as a prime example of where this occurred within 
the confines of step one of Chevron: the agency’s claim to Chevron 
deference lost out to Justice Stevens’s fidelity to the CAA’s text, as well 
as its protective goals and purposes.178 Conversely, if an agency adopts 
an expansive statutory reading that helps to further Congress’s own 
broad protective or remedial purposes, then Justice Stevens appears 
likely to give deference to the agency’s reasonable views — as he did, 
for example, in his dissenting opinions in SWANCC, Rapanos, and 
Sutton and in his majority opinion in Babbitt.  
B. The Remedial Purpose Canon 
In seeking to ensure that administrative agencies implementing 
Congress’s statutory schemes respect Congress’s broad protective or 
remedial purposes, Justice Stevens’s purposivist interpretive approach 
overlaps significantly with the so-called remedial purpose canon. The 
remedial purpose canon, which serves as a tool of statutory 
construction, calls upon courts to construe protective or remedial 
statutes broadly to effectuate their animating purposes.179 Although it 
 
 173 Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 174 Id. at 488-89 (majority opinion).  
 175 Id. at 504-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 176 Id. at 497 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994)).  
 177 Id. at 495. 
 178 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 500-01 (2007).  
 179 See generally Watson, supra note 16 (providing general discussion of remedial 
purpose canon).  
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has been the subject of much criticism and debate,180 the canon has 
been invoked in a wide range of cases covering topics such as 
workplace safety, public health, discrimination, and securities.181 
Often, it plays a role in cases that involve safety legislation, such as the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.182 In 1943, for example, in 
United States v. Dotterweich, Justice Frankfurter noted that the 
purposes of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act touch phases of 
the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern 
industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.”183 Implicitly 
invoking the remedial purpose canon, Justice Frankfurter noted that 
“[r]egard for these purposes should infuse construction of the 
legislation if it is to be treated as a working instruction of government 
and not merely as a collection of English words.”184 
Similarly, in 2000 in FDA v. Brown & Williamson — an opinion 
holding that the FDA lacked the statutory authority to regulate 
tobacco — Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion joined by Justice 
Stevens implicitly invoked the remedial purpose canon in arguing that 
the statute should be read to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco.185 
Specifically, Justice Breyer argued that the “statute’s basic purpose — 
the protection of public health — supports the inclusion of cigarettes 
within its scope.”186 
 
 180 See id. at 266-69 (discussing how debate surrounding canon has “heated up” in 
recent years). 
 181 Id. at 201.  
 182 For some examples of opinions that invoke the remedial purpose canon either 
explicitly or implicitly to liberally construe congressional statutes to effectuate 
remedial or protective purposes, see, for example, Whirlpool v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 
13 (1980) (“[S]afety legislation is to be liberally construed to effectuate the 
congressional purpose.”); United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969) 
(noting that there is “well-accepted principle that remedial legislation such as the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction consistent with the 
Act’s overriding purpose to protect the public health”); Nutritional Health Alliance v. 
FDA, 318 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen we are dealing with the public health, 
the language of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act should not be read too restrictively, 
but rather as ‘consistent with the Act’s overriding purpose to protect the public 
health.’ ”) (internal citations omitted).  
 183 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943). 
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 185 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 162 (2000) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). For the proposition that the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act “is to be 
given a liberal construction consistent with [its] overriding purpose to protect the 
public health,” Justice Breyer cited United States v. Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394 
U.S. 784, 798 (1969).  
 186 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 162. 
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Although only some of Justice Stevens’s opinions consciously cite 
the remedial purpose canon,187 the canon seems to be operating in the 
background of many of Justice Stevens’s opinions to the extent that he 
reads statutes broadly rather than narrowly in order to effectuate what 
he perceives to be Congress’s remedial or protective goals.188 In 
particular, he often appears willing to read statutes impacting the 
public’s security, safety, and welfare (such as environmental laws, 
anti-discrimination statutes, and safety legislation) generously rather 
than narrowly in order to effectuate their overriding purposes. This 
means that when agency action serves the central protective purposes 
of a statute, Justice Stevens seems likely to view judicial deference at 
Chevron step two as being particularly appropriate because such 
deference ensures that the agency is given the leeway it needs to serve 
the broad protective goals of the statute.189 Conversely, if an agency 
adopts a narrow reading of a remedial or protective statute that the 
agency administers (as the EPA arguably did in Massachusetts), then 
Justice Stevens may well refuse to defer to the agency, finding the 
statute to be clear at step one.  
This kind of reliance on the remedial purpose canon, of course, is 
subject to attack on different fronts. One could argue, for example, 
that Justice Stevens’s implicit reliance on the remedial purpose canon 
is vulnerable to the charge that he is discerning broad congressional 
purposes and reading statutes broadly not because he is truly seeking 
to advance Congress’s own goals and purposes, but rather because he 
is sympathetic to the underlying remedial goals of the statutes.190 
Justice Scalia would likely be one to make this kind of a charge. He 
 
 187 See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (“[W]e have explained that 
the [Securities Exchange Act] should be construed ‘not technically and restrictively, 
but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.’ ”); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
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of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to 
effectuate its purposes.’ ”).  
 188 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 788 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 
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Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704-05 (1995). 
 189 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820, 
821-22; SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687, 
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has attacked the remedial purpose canon in the past, arguing that it is 
“wonderfully indeterminate” because “no one knows what a ‘remedial 
statute’ is” and “no one knows how liberal is a liberal construction.”191 
Specifically, Justice Scalia has charged that judges use (or refrain from 
using) the canon depending on whether it will assist “in reaching the 
result the court wishes to achieve.”192 Others have levied similar 
charges against the canon, suggesting that it can be used as a “tool of 
manipulation wielded by judges desirous of cloaking judicial 
willfulness in formalistic verbiage.”193 
If directed at Justice Stevens, however, such criticism seems 
misdirected in light of various Stevens decisions that suggest that he 
will not reject any and all agency constructions that undercut 
protective or remedial values. Nor will he simply rubber stamp any 
and all agencies constructions that reach broad, protective results. 
Take Chevron itself, for example. There, Justice Stevens ultimately 
made no reference to the remedial purpose canon in his opinion even 
though the environmental groups challenging the EPA’s “bubble 
concept” argued in their brief to the Court that rejecting the EPA’s 
reading was consistent with “settled principles for construing a 
remedial statute which seeks to protect public health from hazards 
over which people have no personal control.”194 In fact, after taking 
into account the two competing interests that Congress sought to 
accommodate, Justice Stevens ultimately deferred to the EPA despite 
environmentalists’ claims that the EPA’s reading would fail to improve 
air quality.195 
Another example can be found in Justice Stevens’s opinion for the 
Court in Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers 
Compensation Programs.196 There, Justice Stevens rejected an argument 
that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 
(“LHWCA”) should be read broadly, consistent with the remedial 
purpose canon, to provide a complete and adequate remedy to an 
injured employee. He noted that implicit in this argument was the 
incorrect “assumption that the sole purpose of the Act was to provide 
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disabled workers with a complete remedy for their industrial 
injuries.”197 Specifically, he noted that the LHWCA “represents a 
compromise between the competing interests of disabled laborers and 
their employers.”198  
Similarly, in Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. EPA,199 Justice Stevens (then 
a judge sitting on the Seventh Circuit) reached a result that diverges 
from what would have been most protective of the public’s health. In 
Stearns, then-Judge Stevens was faced with deciding whether the EPA 
had acted improperly in determining that a rat poison — which had 
killed and led to the hospitalization of both adults and children — was 
“misbranded” within the meaning of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) when subjected to “willful 
misuse.”200 Despite the protective goals of FIFRA, then-Judge Stevens 
concluded that there was “no statutory support” for application of the 
Act’s “misbranding” standard to “misuse” of a product.201 In reaching 
this conclusion, he quoted Justice Frankfurter for the following 
proposition: “In our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of 
protecting the public, we must take care not to extend the scope of the 
statute beyond the point where Congress indicated it would stop.”202 
Hence, as Stearns illustrates, Justice Stevens clearly recognizes that 
there are limits to how liberally the protective aims of a statute can be 
read and to how much leeway agencies can be given to achieve 
protective aims.  
CONCLUSION 
The picture of Justice Stevens that should emerge from this Article is 
that of a justice whose purposivist interpretive method enables him to 
give deference to agency interpretations that resolve ambiguities in 
favor of protective statutory purposes and conversely to refuse to defer 
to narrow agency constructions where doing so would undermine the 
 
 197 Id. at 280-81. 
 198 Id. at 282.  
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protective or remedial design of a statute.203 This means that Justice 
Stevens’s opinions, such as his landmark global warming decision in 
Massachusetts, often support results that might be viewed as “liberal” 
in the sense that they serve to protect the public’s health, safety, 
security, and welfare.204 But this does not appear to be because he is 
imposing his own view of wise policy or his own view of what would 
best protect the public interest. Instead, he recognizes the limits of 
advancing the public interest within the confines of statutory 
constraints, and he appears to be considering Congress’s animating 
goals and seeking to ensure that agencies act in ways that further 
rather than undercut Congress’s own remedial and protective goals. 
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Massachusetts, accordingly, ought not be 
viewed as his Chevron opinion “turned inside out.”205 Rather, when 
viewed alongside other Stevens opinions, Massachusetts and Chevron 
nicely illustrate Justice Stevens’s longstanding commitment to 
purposivism. 
 
 203 Opinions from the Second Circuit — relying in part on Supreme Court 
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